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I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001.  That fateful day in our history has 
severely and permanently impacted our nation.  The human loss at 
the points of impact left a deep wound in our national soul.  The 
financial losses rippled outward from the zone of impact in the 
form of market instability to countless layoffs in aviation and other 
affected industries.  Although we can rebuild the physical
destruction caused by the attacks, the irreplaceable personal and 
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financial losses demanded changes.  The devastating nature of the 
tragedy called for an enormous human, financial and military 
response.
Our legislative branch quickly mobilized to redress some of 
the damage.  Congress first passed the Air Transportation Safety 
and System Stabilization Act (“ATSSSA”),1 which created a “no-
fault” Victims’ Compensation Fund, a $15 billion assistance
package for airlines, and a slate of mandated security measures.
Expanding on the security measures for our homeland and our 
airports, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act of 2001 (“ATSA”)2 shortly thereafter.  More recently, Congress 
passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”)3 to guarantee, 
for a limited period, the costs of insurance claims from terrorism.
For a legal system founded upon basic principles of fairness 
and stare decisis, what does this legislative reaction to September 
11th mean for the future of tort law and loss allocation?  Has the 
government undertaken an appropriate role in response to the 
losses caused by terrorist acts or should our traditional tort system 
alone allocate such losses?  On the one hand, the government’s 
measures seem necessary to preserve our economy, save our air 
transportation system and insurance industry, and ensure
compensation for victims.  Opponents may criticize the measures as 
an unfair subsidy for affected industries that should be able to 
spread the risk to the consumers of their products and services.
Regardless of where one stands on that issue, the effects of the 
tragedy and the legislative response have altered tort law in this 
area.  Since the attack, the government and media have warned the 
public of the likelihood and possible modes of the next terrorist 
attack. In response to these threats and warnings, airports, border 
patrols, and businesses have implemented extensive security
measures.  Each of us has safety and security concerns while
traveling on an aircraft, attending a sporting event, visiting a
national landmarks, using a bridge or being near a power plant.
Does our increased awareness of security, derived from past 
terrorist acts and the real threat of future terrorist activity in our 
1. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (Sept. 22, 2001) (codified as amended at 
49 U.S.C. § 40101).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001) (codified as amended at 
49 U.S.C. § 114).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 6701).
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/12
LAWDER ARTICLE CURRENT FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:22 PM
2003] SEPTEMBER 11TH, TORT LAW, AND INSURANCE 811
homeland, raise the standard of care for businesses and property 
owners in providing security for employees and customers?  If so, 
how extensive is the duty to provide such protection?  What is a 
reasonable measure of security?  What is a foreseeable use of a 
product?  What is a foreseeable terrorist threat?  These are among
the questions businesses, property owners, and their insurers must 
find answers to based on the previously unforeseen becoming a 
reality.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11TH
A. The Fund
American citizens have been victims of terrorist activity many 
times in the past in situations not involving aviation – the
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, the U.S.S. Cole, and the 
first World Trade Center bombing.  Although each was a terrible 
tragedy, the damage, loss of life and effect on particular industries
and our economy in those situations were not as great as the effects 
of September 11th.  Hijackings and terrorism on international 
flights, such as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, have also been risks that we have accepted and dealt with 
through the tort system.  Our legal system traditionally handled 
damage caused by terrorist acts like any other mass disaster.  The 
fault-based approach to liability and damages did not yield to the 
enormity of each tragedy.
But the attacks of September 11th – the hijackings out of our 
own airports of aircrafts full of United States citizens to be used as 
suicide missiles on our own national landmarks – did not represent 
a known or accepted risk and caused unprecedented damage, 
financial peril and insecurity.  The government acted quickly.  In 
eleven days it passed the ATSSSA4 into law establishing three major 
components: an airline assistance package,5 an assortment of
mandated security measures,6 and the September 11th Victims’ 
Compensation Fund of 2001 (“the Fund”).7  Airports, airlines and 
aircraft manufacturers received protection through limitation of 
4. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (Sept. 22, 2001) (codified as amended at 
49 U.S.C. § 40101).
5. 49 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
6. Id. § 501.
7. Id. § 401.
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their liability to the extent of their liability insurance.8  As a 
countermeasure to that apparent limitation of liability and the risk 
of uncollectibility, the Fund was designed to ensure compensation 
for victims of the terrorist attacks.9
The Fund provides compensation to individuals who suffered 
physical injury, or to representatives of individuals who died as a 
result of the attacks,10 provided they do not seek restitution for 
claims through the courts.11  There is no liability or negligence 
showing required to recover from the Fund.12  It is a classic “no-
fault” system, similar to no-fault automobile insurance covering 
medical expense and wage loss that many states, including
Minnesota, have adopted.  The Fund, however, prohibits civil 
recovery in court except from the terrorist entities.13
The Fund also includes several significant provisions that affect 
the amount of damages that can be recovered.  For example, it 
prohibits punitive damages14 but allows the recovery of both
“economic” as well as a broad range of “noneconomic” damages, 
including physical and emotional pain and suffering.15  In order to 
achieve consistency and predictability with respect to economic 
damages, Fund recovery sacrifices significant economic recovery for 
higher income earners16 and reduces recovery to the extent of 
collateral sources such as life insurance.17
B. Tort Recovery Alternative
While no-fault systems typically foreclose any alternative
recovery, victims of September 11th can elect to forgo the Fund 
and seek traditional tort recovery.  However, there are procedural 
and practical difficulties with doing so.  For one, a plaintiff’s choice 
of venue is limited to the Southern District of New York.18  Further, 
8. Id. § 408(a).
9. Id. §§ 401, 403.
10. Id. § 405(a)(2)(B)(i).
11. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
12. Id. § 405(b)(2).
13. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
14. Id. § 405(b)(5).
15. Id. § 405(a)(2)(B)(ii).
16. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIMS’ COMPENSATION FUND OF 
2001, PRESUMED ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC LOSS TABLES § II.A.1 (2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc_matrices.pdf.
17. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2003).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 408(b)(3) (2002).
4
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the limited liability of airlines, airports and manufacturers will at 
some point affect a plaintiff’s ability to recover large judgments.
Perhaps the most significant deterrent comes from the uncertainty 
of being the test case for future plaintiffs.
The risk of foregoing Fund recovery and the prospect of 
establishing liability for entities (other than terrorist entities) are 
daunting challenges.  Obviously, the terrorists and their
organizations are primarily to blame, but can sufficient facts be 
pled, discovered and proven to allocate fault to the airlines, the 
airport security companies and other potential defendants?  While 
it is easy to theorize various claims and lay blame in the abstract, 
principles such as foreseeability and causation pose hurdles that 
the facts might not overcome.  For example, does a security
company breach its duty when it allows a passenger to board 
carrying a box-cutter that at the time was not prohibited on
aircraft?  Seemingly beyond the limits of causation are claims 
against the aircraft manufacturers, the airports, the FAA, security 
officials in the World Trade Center, the NY/NJ Port Authority, 
designers and builders of the World Trade Center, manufacturers 
of products contained in the buildings, and flight schools that 
trained terrorists.
Evidentiary issues also make proof of crucial facts very difficult.
Other than cockpit voice recordings and cell phone calls, there is 
little evidence as to what weapons the terrorists used in the
September 11th attacks.  If claims against the airline are based on 
vicarious liability for hiring the security companies, and there is 
little or no real independent basis for the facts leading up to the 
impact with the World Trade Center, the challenge may be
insurmountable.  Yet, the heightened standard of care owed by 
airlines as common carriers to their passengers may nonetheless 
allow such claims to proceed.
These considerations, commentators suggest, will lead most 
victims of September 11th to seek compensation from the Fund.19
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FUTURE TERRORISM
Congress has also responded legislatively to the increased risk 
and loss allocation problem caused by terrorism following
19. E.g., Raymond L. Mariani, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001 and the Protection of the Airline Industry: A Bill for the American People, 67 J. AIR L.
& COM. 141, 182 (2002).
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September 11th.  It did this through the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), which Congress approved in November 
2002.20  TRIA notes that the reasonable and predictable availability
of insurance against catastrophic loss is crucial to economic growth 
and stability, and that the ability of the insurance industry to cover 
losses from any future terrorism likewise is crucial to economic 
recovery.21  However, given the difficulty of making statistically valid 
estimates of the probability and cost of future terrorist events, the 
insurance industry could understandably respond by either
terminating coverage for terrorist events or dramatically increasing 
premiums—both of which could seriously hamper economic
activity. 22  The purpose of TRIA, therefore, is:
[T]o establish a temporary Federal program that provides 
for a transparent system of shared public and private
compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of 
terrorism, in order to —
(1) protect consumers by addressing market
disruptions and ensure the continued widespread
availability and affordability of property and casualty 
insurance for terrorism risk; and
(2) allow for a transitional period for the private 
markets to stabilize, resuming pricing of such
insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future 
losses, while preserving State insurance regulation
and consumer protections.23
In a nutshell, the government will partially cover the costs of 
insurance claims resulting from defined instances of terrorism for 
three years.  For the first year, the insurance companies will have to 
cover an amount equal to 7 percent of their previous year’s
premiums, rising to 10 percent in the second year, and 15 percent
in the third.24  The remaining portion of the losses will be borne by 
the government up to a total payout cap of $100 billion.25  As one 
industry advocate explained, “[o]ur entire focus [in advocating for 
TRIA] was to increase the capacity and ability of private insurance 
20. See Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 101(a).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 101(b).
24. Id. § 102(7)(A-D).
25. Deirdre Davidson, Business Gave Insurers’ Fight Stronger Focus How a Broad 
Coalition of Insureds Helped Turn Tide on Terrorism Bill, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, 
at 1.
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to provide terrorism insurance . . . . We think this bill does that . . . .
[I]t gets the market stabilized.”26
TRIA means that for a limited time, the government will 
ultimately bear the risk of catastrophic losses caused by terrorism if 
the viability of the insurance industry is threatened.  Like the 
Victims’ Compensation Fund of ATSSSA, TRIA ensures the
compensation of victims and the preservation of the insurance 
industry.  Unlike the ATSSSA Fund, TRIA places initial
responsibility on businesses and their insurers under a fault-based
approach to loss allocation.  However, the government will still 
ultimately back up the enormous catastrophic losses.
IV. TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING DUTY TO PROTECT
The shifting responsibility for losses must be accompanied by 
ascertainable and understandable standards upon which that
responsibility is assigned.  Moreover, although the ways in which 
the losses occurred are unique and appalling, the framework in 
which to judge whether others in addition to the terrorists should 
bear responsibility is largely in place in modern American tort law.
Although Minnesota courts have yet to deal with terrorist 
attacks, the assignment of responsibility to business and property 
owners for the intentional acts of others has largely developed 
under the duty to protect.  Minnesota Supreme Court Justice 
Simonett explained the practical difficulties in arriving at and 
specifying such a duty to protect:
[A] duty to protect against the devious, sociopathic, and 
unpredictable conduct of criminals does not lend itself 
easily to an ascertainable standard of care uncorrupted by 
hindsight nor to a determination of causation that avoids 
speculation.  There is a difference between a landowner’s
duty to sand a slippery step on his premises and his duty 
to contain a slippery criminal.  In the latter instance, the 
landowner is being asked to take defensive measures 
against a third person not within his control, indeed, 
someone who tries to outwit any defenses.27
As a general rule, Minnesota does not recognize a legal duty to 
control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing 
harm to another.28  However, courts will find such a duty when the 
26. Id. (quoting Jeffrey DeBoer, president of the Real Estate Roundtable).
27. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989).
28. Sulik v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 747, 750 (D. Minn. 1994).
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parties have a “special relationship,” such that one party has in 
some way entrusted his or her safety to the other.29  Furthermore, 
even if a duty to protect exists, the duty only extends to
“foreseeable” acts, an inquiry that is partially subsumed in the 
special-relationship inquiry.30  Thus, a business or property owner’s 
liability for damage caused by the terrorist acts of another will 
depend upon both the owner’s relationship with the plaintiff and 
the foreseeability of the terrorist act.
Minnesota courts have found a “special relationship” in a very 
limited number of situations: certain hospital-patient
relationships,31 landlord-tenant relationships,32 and most recently, 
in a merchant-customer relationship.33  Among the factors
establishing a special relationship are:
• the extent to which the plaintiff is vulnerable or
deprived of opportunities for self-defense;
• the extent to which the plaintiff has entrusted his safety 
to the defendant;
• whether the defendant is in a position to protect the 
plaintiff;
• whether the property or business presents a particular 
focus or unique opportunity for criminals.34
If there is no special relationship, there is no duty to protect.35
However, if a special relationship is found, the defendant’s duty to 
protect only extends to foreseeable risks.36  The test of foreseeability 
is whether the defendant is aware of facts indicating that the 
plaintiff was being exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm.37  The 
extent of foreseeability shapes the nature of the defendant’s duty 
and sets the standard of care.  As Justice Cardozo said, “[t]he risk 
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk 
29. Id.
30. Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
31. See, e.g., Roettger v. United Hosp., 380 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986).
32. See, e.g., Vermes v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 251 N.W.2d 101, 105-06 (Minn. 
1977).
33. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
34. Id. at 168-69.
35. United Prod. Corp. of Am. v. Atlas Auto Parts, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 401, 403 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
36. Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
37. Id. at 158.
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imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range 
of apprehension.”38
Since September 11, 2001, the foreseeability of terrorism – the 
“risk reasonably to be perceived” – has increased dramatically.  The 
formerly unthinkable is now a distinct possibility.  This heightened 
foreseeability has infused the duty to protect with a similarly
heightened standard of care.
V. THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF CARE
September 11th has taught us that terrorism can cause
widespread damage in unique, unexpected ways.  The media 
regularly puts the public on notice and has heightened our
awareness of possible terrorist threats to air travel, nuclear power
plants, treasured sites and landmarks, communication systems, and 
environment.  Our government has responded to the nation’s 
demand for preparedness at least with regard to aviation and 
transportation.  In the Aviation Security and Transportation
Security Act of 2001, specific security measures have been
implemented: baggage screening, federalization of the aviation 
security work force, bag matching, air marshals, cockpit protection, 
National Guard security at airports, and carry-on restrictions.39
Because we are now more cognizant of, and have mandated
security against, terrorist activities, will responsibility be accordingly 
apportioned when that security is breached in the future?
Our heightened awareness of terrorist and security risks (risks 
that are arguably more foreseeable today than prior to September 
11, 2001) provides the opportunity to re-examine this question 
under the fact-specific inquiry of the special relationship test.
Certainly we have heightened expectations of reasonable protective
measures in the aviation setting.  The heightened duty of care owed 
by airlines will be further raised when it comes to measures that are 
designed to protect against criminal acts.  The legislated security 
changes will define the minimum standard of care owed, and the 
breach of which will yield liability, including negligence per se.  But 
with the government stepping into a security role, courts will 
delineate the limits of discretionary immunity in this context.  This 
38. Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
39. Peter Dizikes, Plane Truths Since Sept. 11, There Are Plenty of New Laws; But Is 
Flying Safer? (March 11, 2002), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/DailyNews/airsecurity_sixmonths0203
11.html (last visited January 15, 2003).
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increasing awareness and preparedness will also affect the
vulnerability to litigation of any business that congregates large 
numbers of people and any structure that is “high profile” or a 
desirable target.40
With respect to the damages caused by September 11th, the 
temptation to turn hindsight into the standard of care by which all 
of the stakeholders are judged does not seem fair, both because of 
the unforeseeability of the attack and because the victims will be 
compensated by the Fund.  An irony of September 11th is that 
although the manner of attack was unforeseeable, the World Trade 
Center “parking ramp” was previously the target of a terrorist act –
the first terrorist bombing in 1993.  It seems a stretch to argue that 
September 11th was foreseeable in light of the first World Trade 
Center bombing, and even more difficult to argue what the
standard of care required.  However, the future will be less
forgiving, and courts will be more inclined to view terrorist threats 
as foreseeable, particularly when the cost of prevention or
minimizing harm is not onerous.
VI. DUTY AS A POLICY CHOICE
The existence of a business or property owner’s duty of
reasonable care to protect against foreseeable terrorist threats will 
also depend on various policy considerations, including a balancing 
of costs and benefits.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained:
Presumably, we do not live in a risk-free society; if this is 
so, a cost-benefit analysis is unavoidable.  To post security 
guards at each parking ramp level 24 hours a day might 
be the most effective crime deterrent, but the cost may be 
prohibitive for both the property owner and the customer 
. . . . The question of how much security is adequate 
raises, therefore, the further question of how much risk is 
an acceptable risk for members of the public.41
In Minnesota, any decision to expand on the duty owed by 
property and business owners must recognize that not all terrorist 
or criminal activity is preventable.  It is difficult to imagine a 
reasonable way to guard against the theft and use of a small plane 
loaded with explosives and crashed to destroy a stadium or mall.  A 
cost-benefit analysis would counsel against imposing continuous 
40. Ed Bethune et al., What’s Expected Now: The ‘Reasonable Man’ Standard for 
Liability Is Much Higher Since Sept. 11, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 24.
41. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989).
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monitoring of all small aircraft for this purpose where the financial 
impact on the general aviation industry is already precarious and 
the public would be asked to absorb the increased costs incurred by 
the government.  On the other hand, if the imposition of a duty 
would yield procedures that prohibit access to ventilation systems 
in prominent structures, or that plan and train for the orderly 
evacuation of a building, and the expense is justifiable, the cost-
benefit analysis should not prohibit the duty.  The emphasis in the 
standard should be on the practicality of minimizing injury and 
damage that could have been limited or prevented even where the 
initial act or impact could not have been.
Interestingly, the precautionary security measures and disaster 
plans that businesses are implementing derive from what they 
perceive as a real threat.  It is good business to be prepared and to 
protect your employees and customers.  This precautionary
conduct is driving the emergence of a duty and shaping the 
contours of the standard.
Perhaps the “next attack” scenario will involve circumstances 
beyond the reach of foreseeability.  But in the wake of September 
11th and the frenzied discussions of security in the media, mall 
owners, entertainment venues, utility operators, office buildings 
and other public and private gathering places have been put on 
notice by the predictions of the media and the suspicions of 
experts and the government.  The generic merchant-customer
relationship which was previously indistinguishable in the eyes of 
the law from the situation “out on the street and in the
neighborhood generally,”42 will be subject to reconsideration where 
that relationship focuses on the attractiveness of the location as a 
potential terrorist target.  If a parking ramp presented a particular 
focus and unique opportunity for criminal activity justifying “some 
duty” before the age of homeland terrorism, this new world we live 
in demands a greater one.
VII. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
A business or property owner seeking to ascertain what security 
measures are required, and at what cost, faces a difficult task.  The 
goal of the law in this area is to determine what measure of 
protection would be satisfactory or reasonable and to assign
responsibility for damages proximately caused by the breach of 
42. Id.
11
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those reasonable, expected measures.  Obviously, the standard of 
care depends on the circumstances confronted by each business or 
property owner.  How much preparation and security would satisfy 
this duty is dependent on the unique circumstances involved.
Some general guidance can be found in language from the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, which could easily be applicable to a 
case emanating from a future terrorist attack:
The operator or owner of a [______________] has a duty 
to use reasonable care to deter criminal activity on its
premises which may cause personal harm to customers.
The care to be provided is that care which a reasonably 
prudent operator or owner would provide under like
circumstances.  Among the circumstances to be
considered are the location and construction of the
[_________], the practical feasibility and cost of various 
security measures, and the risk of personal harm to
customers which the owner or operator knows, or in the
exercise of due care should know, presents a reasonable 
likelihood of happening. In this connection, the owner 
or operator is not an insurer or guarantor of the safety of 
its premises and cannot be expected to prevent all
criminal activity.43
Because such a standard will be applied by judges and juries 
who live in the very same society in which these risks have come to 
life, the risk of liability based upon what, in hindsight, would have 
avoided a particular tragedy, will always be present.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Imperfect as the system is, it incorporates familiar guideposts 
to the assignment of financial responsibility, such as the special 
relationship test and the concept of foreseeability, but still allows 
for the consideration of individual circumstances.  This return to 
the fault-based approach of loss allocation from the “no-fault” Fund 
created after September 11th reflects the emerging awareness and 
risk of terrorism in our homeland.  The government’s guaranty 
against the catastrophic losses of large-scale terrorism, however, 
also assures that victims will not go without compensation.
Although in the end the taxpayers may carry the burden, freedom 
is priceless.
43. Id. at 169-70.
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